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Geography has occasionally sought to claim to be a spatial science, sometimes it has sought to 
define itself through ‘areal differentiation’, or the synthesis of different factors in a specific 
environs. Indeed, commonsensically, geography has tied its remit to definitions which put ‘space’ at 
the centre of geography. And yet if we ask a class of first year students what space is, the most 
constructive answer tends to be ‘the final frontier’. In fact it is probably true that most students 
arrive at university with up to nine years studying geography, and yet rarely have they worked 
through explicit theorisations of space. It is taken as obvious, as self evident and not really in need 
of further examination. I mean once we have located things there hardly seems more to be said. 
Except if you do ask for a little more clarity, as to what space is, suddenly things begin to unravel. 
Our assurance in using the word space yet our lack of specificity about it reminds me of the 
discussion of time by St Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, in 397AD, 
‘What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to 
him who asks me, I do not know.’(397 [1955], book 11, chapter 14} 
Both time and space are everyday terms which everyone commonsensically understands and thus 
are often undefined. This lack of definition is exacerbated by disciplinary divisions since geography 
has tended to define itself as spatial, and thus tended to regard time as not its province. Thus asking 
geography students about notions of space produces a variety of answers, whereas if I ask those 
geography students about time then they draw a blank. If time is considered problematic it is in the 
sense of finding an appropriate scale to match the process and phenomena studied – just as with 
spatial categories. The only question is how much of each gets looked at, rather than their actual 
nature. Recently I shall suggest, and other chapters in this volume show, there has been quite a bit 
of geographical attention to what space actually is, its relationship with scalar categories such as 
regions, localities or indeed with notions of place. I want to follow through these issues to unpack 
the ‘space’ side of the dichotomy as this essay progresses. In this way I want to disrupt the binary 
by illustrating that space is neither self-evident nor self sufficient but is rather often mutually and 
problematically defined by and with problematic concepts of time. And it is at this latter point that 
we have to concede geographers have not developed an extensive engagement. 
 
So both space, with which geography identifies, and time seem to be so obvious as categories as to 
not need further scrutiny. Except I shall argue that they both carry so much baggage and so many 
different meanings, that both need careful attention. So in this chapter I suggest, first, that both 
space and time have multiple facets and definitions. Second, not only are they both complex in 
themselves but also they tend to be mutually defined (or undefined). Thus definitions of time often 
lean, explicitly or implicitly, on definitions of space and vice versa. I shall try and show that 
sometimes this is a process whereby time is likened to space (but rarely the other way round) and 
paradoxically space is defined as the opposite of time in a classic dualism. These analytic divisions 
then drive different ontologies and philosophical positions. Thus for instance Doreen Massey (1992; 
1998) has argued that for radical politics the traditionally important category has been time, which 
is associated with the possibilities of progress and change. Typically this involved linking the 
dualism of space and time with another great philosophical dualism – being and becoming. Being is 
about enduring essences and entities whereas becoming is about process unfolding over time. Space 
is elided with Being, time with Becoming. The result, to paraphrase many, many reworkings of an 
essay by Foucault, is that time is seen as fecund and creative while space is seen as passive and 
inert. And yet over the last decade or two there has been something of an inversion of this, or to use 
Soja’s (1989) sub-title – a reassertion of space in social theory.  
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Some have argued there is an epochal shift in concerns from time to space, that our concepts of 
relationships between space and time are being impacted by social changes. Thus we find the very 
often invoked quote from Michel Foucault that: 
‘The great obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know, history: with its 
themes of development and of suspension, of crisis, and cycle, themes of the ever-
accumulating past, with its great preponderance of dead men and the menacing 
glaciation of the world. […] The present epoch will perhaps be above all the 
epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of 
juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. 
We are at a moment. I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a 
long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and 
intersects with its own skein.’ (‘Of Other Spaces’ 1967, reprinted in Foucault 
1986, page 22) 
This programmatic statement has come to be used, just as I use it here, as a masthead for an account 
that sees theory moving to engage with the spatial. This theoretical shift is argued to parallel social 
and material changes, in a world of globalised media and trade, where the effects of shifts in one 
market are felt instantly in another. Thus Fred Jameson depicts a world characterised by 
simultaneity, producing an aesthetic of pastiche which amounts to the eclectic assemblage of the 
forms of many eras. Put simply instead of linear process of one style or from succeeding another, or 
being seen as superior to it, they coexist at the same time (Jameson 1998). The architect Bernard 
Tschumi (1999, page 170; figure 1) graphs this simply, labelling space as ‘synchronic time’ – the 
coexistence of objects in the same time. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ROUND HERE 
 
Jameson thus argues what is required is a new way of keeping our bearings – a ‘cognitive mapping’ 
to cope with this temporal coexistence. Jameson suggests then that in the current epoch the 
language of theory, and possibly its ontological concern shifts from temporal unfolding to spatial 
occlusion – instead of the consequences of actions being played out over history, the primary issue 
is one of their rapid diffusion over space, instead of time hiding the consequences it is space. Or in 
artistic movements “the organisation of space has become the primary aesthetic problem of mid-
twentieth century culture, as the problem of time (in Bergson, Proust, and Joyce) was the primary 
aesthetic problem of the first decades of this century” (Daniel Bell cited in Harvey 1989, page 201). 
Figuring the zeitgeist of our age in this manner may be appealing but it clearly overstates any 
putative shift in concern. As Fred Jameson recently sardonically commented: 
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‘After the end of history, what? No further beginnings being foreseen, it can only 
be the end of something else. But modernism had already ended some time ago 
and with it, presumably, time itself, as it was widely rumored that space was 
supposed to replace time in the general ontological scheme of things. At the very 
least time had become a non-person and people stopped writing about it.’(2003, 
page 695) 
He goes on to pose a difficult question which is whether some of the theoretical concepts I am 
going to develop towards the end of the chapter can successfully patch together a dualism when it 
too often seems that ‘Time and Space are at war in a Homeric combat’ (page 698). O rather than a 
disciplinary celebration that social theory seems to have noticed geography, we need to unpack how 
space and time interact. 
 
So my first step is to unpack a range of types of space and then outline a similar range of ideas of 
time. Thus at the very least we can suggest there is no simple binary between two terms, but 
relationships between different sets of terms, and thus often different relationships between specific 
different elements. What I then hope to suggest is that many of these specific and varying 
definitions are subtended by specific and varying dualisms – and to illustrate this I want to follow 
through two ways spatial models have been used to understand time. In the first, I will examine how 
one of the ontologies of space identified in the following section – abstract space – has been seen as 
at best informing problematic understandings of time and at worst rather obfuscating the whole 
notion of temporality. This example has been used to illustrate the problems of spatialising time, 
and lies at the heart of how space has often been regarded as secondary to history. I want to suggest 
that at the least we see this as a problem not maybe inherent in spatial notions but those particular 
spatial notions. The second example I then want to use takes a looser epistemology about space, that 
of landscape as convergence, to indicate a multiplicity of temporalities interacting. Here space is 
used to free up and pluralize what ‘time’ entails. My final move then is to look at categories that 
seek to link space and time – and here I want to focus upon a concept taken from the literary critic 
Mikhail Bakhtin – the chronotope. 
 
 
Multiple Spaces  
 
This section recaps some of the issue in chapter xx (Agnew) to highlight senses of space that have 
played an important role in relation to notions of time. If we start with most obvious sense of space 
it is that of location. And what do we mean at bottom by ‘located’? A definition often might start, 
 4
and all too quickly all too often end, with co-ordinates, x and y, east-west and north-south as a form 
of Newtonian space. It tends to imply a sense of space as length, area or volume, that is infinitely 
divisible into units (x1, x2, x3, … xn, y1, y2, y3 … yn, and thus locations combining these). The 
implication then is that space is about difference in location, not type. That is we tend to assume 
two things. First, that objects are independent of location – a house at one end of a street might be 
the same as one at the other, and the only difference between them is position. This is not to say 
there is no difference, one need only think of the three key factors in house prices (‘Location; 
location; location’) to see that spatial position matters. But the type of difference is enumerative or 
quantitative. We can see this notion of space taken to its logical conclusion in the assumptions 
behind the spatial models of von Thunen or Christaller – an isotropic plain, where space is 
homogenous and quantifiable, where all other differences are stripped out. Such a concept of space 
has real consequences. Perhaps the most famous example is the mapping of the west of the USA 
where, beyond route 277 in Ohio, land was marked out for potential homesteads, settlements and 
townships from great sweeping meridians charted across the land with such regularity that it was 
compared to graph paper (Linklater 2002, page 178). It drained out all substantive content from 
space and replaced it with empty, exchangeable units of measurement. What this facilitated was the 
rapid commodification of land – with standard plot sizes and multiples of plot sizes, identified by 
unique location in the grid. Second, then this version of space sees territory as divisible and 
multipliable. In other words since the only difference between places is location, they can be ever 
more finely sub-divided into smaller components, or indeed added together to form larger units. The 
only change is quantity. As Lefebvre put it: ‘This is a space, therefore, that is homogeneous yet at 
the same time broken up into fragments’ (Lefebvre 1991, page 342). 
 
There are numerous other ways of conceptualising space from which I am going to select three that 
highlight themes that emerge later. So we might firstly make an argument that this empty space is 
actually too solid, that it gives meaning to space before content. A relational, Leibnizian view of 
space instead sees it as only defined by the objects within it and their relationships one to the other. 
For instance, a Feudal society where a land grant might be measured in land sufficient to graze a 
herd of pigs (to take one form of measurement used in England’s eleventh century Domesday book) 
has a very different notion of space than one where standard units of length and width define 
ownership. The differing senses of space and different epochs is not just a story about accuracy of 
measurement it is about differing societies relationship to space, as Lefebvre would say not just a 
matter of social relations and contradictions in space but of space (Lefebvre 1991, page 334). To put 
it another way societies do not just occur in a pregiven space where the only question is how much 
of it they occupy but they actually create space. Thus even if we think of the empty space created in 
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the surveying and dividing of the American West, this was a space produced in order to facilitate 
and enable its colonisation (and balanced the interests of state, farmers and land speculators). Its 
‘emptiness’ and the lack of substantive meaning for any given place is created, it is a ‘semantic void 
that abolishes former meanings’ (Lefebvre 1991, page 307).  
 
This abstract space can be counterposed to  ‘inhabited’ personalised meaning given to places. As 
Michel de Certeau put it, confusingly inverting the terms, space is inhabited place (de Certeau 1984; 
de Certeau 1985). To coin a phrase, houses differ by more than location when one of them becomes 
our home. This division of place and space has been around for a long time, we can trace it certainly 
as far as Plato’s notions of space as the formless, or receptacle or, as we shall see, meeting point 
(chora) and space as known and inhabited place (topos) (Grosz 1995). Given the discussion of the 
instabilities of this opposition elsewhere we might note that Derrida uses chora as meeting point 
between place and space (Eisenman 1997). I want to start thinking about precisely topos too. We 
might think of sacred space, as being what Lefebvre (Lefebvre 1991) would call an absolute space. 
It is not a matter of these being portable, but rather there is a specific investment in one location. 
These sites are precisely not interchangeable. This is the origin for the idea of genius loci, the spirit 
of place but more interestingly this is generally now taken to suggest that special quality of place, 
created through long term attachment and the convergence of many factors – the daily rhythms, 
personal histories and secular and/or religious rituals. The emphasis upon the convergence suggests 
this is about fusion into a new whole. It is not then about ‘extensive boundaries’, about defining 
place through the limits of spatial extension, but rather it is an intensive threshold, where there is an 
internal transformation, like a phase shift (de Landa 1998; de Landa 1999). 
 
If we think back to our first list of binaries what is apparent is that notions of ‘intensive threshold’ 
or ‘habituation’ suggest place Becomes – it is not simply Being. It is made and remade, and, for that 
matter, undone. We might approach this then through a vocabulary that sees space as action not 
location. One way into this is through notions of dwelling, which following Heidegger we might see 
as the activity of being-in-the-world. Certainly we can begin to push the affective dimensions of 
space – its emotional resonance, such as senses of security, and its specificity. Thus Gaston 
Bachelard (1964) identifies spatial archetypes of security such as the den but also further territorial 
binaries of inside and outside. But more strongly there is the sense that this is not space containing 
objects but space that is created through actions and thus we might better talk of spacing. In 
Heidegger’s analysis of a Greek temple he suggests it is not added to a given place but that rather 
‘the building precedes its site’ (Wigley 1993, page 61). That is it is the temple that creates the sense 
of sacred space, it creates the ground for its people (Elden 2001, page 66). Taking the example of 
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Hölderlin’s poetry on the great German rivers, Heidegger argues the rivers are not symbols of 
various places but create those places, they make the lands associated with them not just in a 
geomorphological sense but in the sense of a dwelt territory, and thus the poems are performing 
placing or are ‘platial’ as oppose to spatial (Elden 2001, page 36).  
 
The reason for delving into Heidegger is that first, as we shall see he offers fruitful connections into 
issues of time – which is his main concern. Second, and of more immediate interest here, he moves 
us from seeing abstract space as ‘objective’ and place as ‘subjective’. He pushes against this 
dualism by insisting on the objectivity of dwelling. He argues that that all understanding comes 
from Being in place, by being situated. His focus is neither subject nor object but situation (Jameson 
1999, page 213). In other words there is no unplaced knowledge, no transcendent viewing point and 
no unplaced transcendent subject. While Heidegger’s position can be dangerously conservative, he 
critiques abstract knowledge for depending upon modes of representation which distance us from an 
experiential engagement. This critique finds echoes with Lefebvre’s well known triptych of 
representations of space, representational space and spatial practice (1991, page 40-6) - which can 
be glossed as abstract ideas of space, affective and finally lived space - has provided the framework 
for this section. We move from ideological notions of space, that clearly play a role in shaping 
societies, their structures and activities, through to the sense of the meaning and emotional 
resonance of places before finally thinking about the habitation of those places – not their 
representation through mediating schema but their direct interrelationship with people’s activities 
and identities. It is revealing to look at how some the same issues of multiple meanings are 
replicated in discussions over time. 
 
Multiple Times 
 
If space is often taken as a common sense element and a shared datum which can anchor analyses 
the same can be said of time with added force since there is the added force of direction – time often 
being defined as different from space in that it is irreversible. It is this sense of flow that clearly 
underpins the notion of time as Becoming to space as Being, time as action and space as context. 
However, it is also the case that time is by no means self-evident. In fact to start with lived time we 
might say it more dominated by cycles than linear flows. ‘Everyday life is above all a temporal 
term. As such it conveys the fact of repetition; it refers not to the singular or unique but to that 
which happens ‘day after day’ ‘ (Felski 2000, page 18). This is not a time of developmental logic 
and conscious planning. Cullen suggests the imperatives of routines mean that in quantitative terms, 
deliberative choices: 
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‘are swamped by a dominant pattern  of repetition and routine. We spend very 
little time each day either deliberating some future action or executing a 
previously deliberated one. Most of our time is devoted to living out a fairly 
sophisticated pattern of well ordered and nearly integrated routine.’(Cullen 1978, 
page 31) 
In other words our daily lives have a temporality that is often not the linear flow of time’s arrow but 
is composed of cycles. Getting up, going to work, eating meals, weekdays and week ends all occur 
with stupendous regularity when we look at western societies. On longer scales there are the cycles 
of birthdays and festivals. In other words ritual times, be they religious, personal, commercial or 
mixtures of all of these are often cyclical. Hall (1983) takes the example of the Quiche Maya who 
traditionally had both sacred and civil calendars of each of which had different numbers of different 
length months which interlocked to only repeat every 52 years. As opposed to Anglo European 
calendars where the cycle of routine overlays largely undifferentiated days here each has a proper 
name in the sacred calendar (Page 81). If we look at the Dreamtime of Australian Aboriginals we 
find it is one of continued recurrence and relevance – it is a mythic time marked by being out of our 
current time, that is not past but is continually present (Perkins 1998). And from the sacred we 
should not forget the opposite – profane times, such as the time of carnival or other leisure times 
where the normal order is overturned. So cyclical time can be important in a number of registers. 
Hall concludes we can identify at least 8 clusters of types of time divided around key oppositions 
thus some might be interpreted as physical (eg. ageing, the seasons) while other issues are cultural 
(eg. religion), some times might be defined as  individual or collective, some are ‘exogenous’ 
(where appear they appear objective) and others are contextual (dependent on the beholder), to 
replay the objective and subjective dichotomy. Putting these together we end up with (1) sacred, (2) 
profane, (3) micro scale, (4) synchronised, (5) personal, (6) biological, (7) physical, (8) 
metaphysical types of times (Hall 1983, page 17). 
 
Just to add to the complexity we might chart the changing historical balance of linear and cyclical 
time. Analysts have often pointed to the association of women with reproductive labour, and 
suggested this has had a more cyclical character – whereas men accessing the public realm had 
access to a public time of historical progress. Historically the same pattern inflects class experience 
with linear time being associated with a progressive self-narrative of self-actualisation or 
accomplishment that we find emerging in the early modern period among the bourgeoisie – 
buttressed by congeries of new technologies. So here we find shifts from the book of hours, and 
prayer books suggesting devotional activities for each hour of each day, to personal reflective 
diaries that spin the self, and self-understanding in to a temporal narrative. It is often argued this 
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narrative is connected to a linear time that slowly diffuses through society (Maynes 1989; 1992). It 
is common in studies of literary and textualised version of time to suggest that the ability to grasp 
oneself in time is indeed to sense one’s life as narrative (Currie 1999, page 45). The self then 
becomes a unity through having a narrative development between beginning and ending. Alternate 
accounts look to the rise of capitalism with the time of the ledger book triumphing over the 
mediaeval time, full of chimes ringing out calls to church or mosque (Goff Le 1980). If we have 
seen abstract space as making land a commodity, then we might follow Lewis Mumford in defining 
the clock as the key machine of industrial capitalism (Nowotny 1994, page 47). Each minute of the 
day becomes calculable and measurable – to be bought and sold between capital and labour. We 
have to be cautious about opposing cyclical and linear time, where for instance Hegel, and indeed 
Marx following him, identified Hindu India with cyclical time and thus with a lack of progress, and 
the British colonisers with forward looking dynamic modernity (Spivak 1991). More nuanced 
accounts look to monasteries themselves as incubators of new technologies of time as they invented 
orders and sequences of devotional activities dependent upon their timing through the day and year. 
Indeed religion itself has pushed the notion of the narrative self, as in Augustine, and the sense of 
time as a something to be spent wisely (Fenn 2001).  
 
Even when we begin to think then of time as flow we immediately encounter paradoxes. Let us 
return to Augustine and his great narrative recomposition of the self in the Confessions. In book 11 
where he explicitly thinks through the implications of this for time he first formulates a notion of 
the disappearing present - no sooner thought than it has gone. That is the present is not so much a 
day or an hour or even a second as the fine boundary line between the future and the past, which I 
will suggest we should think not so much as itself moving forwards as being the line through which 
the future flows into the past. As Henri Bergson put it the present is not so much ‘that which is, 
[but] … simply what is being made. Nothing is less than the present moment, if you understand by 
that the indivisible limit that divides the past from the future. When we think this present is going to 
be, it exists not yet, and when we think of it as existing, it is already past’ (1991, pages 149-50). 
The present as the only realm in which we act thus appears to shrink away while the past and future 
quite clearly have a different ontological characters – the one not yet being, the other have ceased to 
be. Grappling with this Augustine reversed this conclusion – producing what we might call the ‘big 
now’ (Ricoeur 1988, page 30) instead of the disappearing present: 
‘But even now it is manifest and clear that there are neither times future nor times 
past. Thus it is not properly said that there are three times, past, present, and 
future. Perhaps it might be said rightly that there are three times: a time present of 
things past; a time present of things present; and a time present of things future. 
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For these three do coexist somehow in the soul, for otherwise I could not see 
them. The time present of things past is memory; the time present of things 
present is direct experience; the time present of things future is expectation.’ (397 
[1955], book 11, chapter 20) 
In this way Augustine moves to ground temporality in human experience rather than an external 
measure. We reach forward to grasp the future while carrying with us our past – and thus we make 
both elements present. The term Augustine uses is ‘distentio animi’ for the stretching of the spirit to 
include our expectations and our memories. The mind expects, it is attentive and it remembers 
(Alliez 1996, page 131). Our own experience will tell us that this is not a uniform sense of time as 
there are occasions when time seems to crawl towards one anticipated event and hurtle away from 
another fondly remembered one (Flaherty 1999).  
 
No moment is then fully self-contained, or as we shall see the present is then precisely not presence. 
As Augustine formulated it in his chapter 14 ‘If, then, time present--if it be time--comes into 
existence only because it passes into time past, how can we say that even this is, since the cause of 
its being is that it will cease to be? Thus, can we not truly say that time is only as it tends toward 
nonbeing?’ Or to restate the significance of this ‘The fragile hold of the present on reality … is 
itself encroached by the surrounding voracious non-existence of past and future’ (Lloyd 1993, page 
22). The insight of the extended present has been carried through into a range of temporal 
ontologies. In Husserl’s phenomenology every instant is marked by protention and retention, 
carrying with it the traces of the past and the seeds of the future. This approach perhaps reaches its 
apogee with Martin Heidegger who looks at temporal Being as matter of three ekstases or modes of 
time; a being-alongside, that is simultaneity, a being-towards-death, that recognises the force of 
time’s arrow for all humans, and ‘thrownness’, that is we find ourselves cast into the world in 
situations neither of our making nor choosing. What is more the depth and shape of these modes is 
shaped by our structure of Care and concern towards the world – in other words the time frame that 
we bring to bear from past and future varies according to the sort of tasks we are undertaking. The 
fundamental insight Heidegger then provides is that life and the subject are temporal. We do not 
develop some notion of the human subject and then insert it into grids of space and time. Rather the 
subject is formed through structures of temporality and spatiality. This sense then of a tripartite time 
where the present is so insubstantial and always slides past I want to contrast with the dominance of 
a form of abstract time, that sees the present as a definable instant. 
  
Time as Space (part 1) 
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Very often time is deployed as though it were a series of salami slices or beads upon a string, a 
series of ‘nows’ that follow one after another in a sequence. The model for this is clearly that of 
abstract space, where to our spatial coordinates we add temporal ones in an infinite and empty 
series (t1, t2, t3, … tn). As Hall puts it taken for granted Anglo-European ‘time is an empty container 
waiting to be filled’ (Hall 1983, page 84). Perhaps the classic example of this treating of space and 
time as an external container is time-geography. Here time is added as another axis to the 
conventional map in order to produce an action space, a container of possibilities. An intriguing 
pattern then emerges of activity prisms (the scope for movement between fixed points in space-
time) which lead to coupling constraints (how different people’s activities can be coordinated) in a 
delicate and fascinating choreography of people’s paths through space time. Thus while the great 
pioneer of time geography, Thorsten Hågerstrand sympathised with some phenomenology of time, 
he argued resolutely that ‘external’ and objective time were the key dimensions (1982, page 324). 
In this vision then people may move quicker or slower, but they share a set of time-space 
dimensions. However Grosz argues this means that : 
‘Even today the equation of temporal relations with the continuum of numbers 
assume that time is isomorphic with space, and that space and time exist as a 
continuum, a unified totality. Time is capable of representation only through its 
subordination to space and spatial models.’ (1995, page 95) 
However in utilising precisely the concepts of abstract space to depict time it presents very much a 
sequence of moments. For all that it plots the paths and trajectories of actors we might say it 
succumbs to the cinematic illusion about time. Thus if we turn back to the early twentieth century 
philosopher Henri Bergson we find him arguing that this approach misses precisely the sense of 
flow in time as it 
‘masks the perception of real movement ... your succession of points are at 
bottom, only so many imaginary halts. You substitute the path for the journey, 
and because the journey is subtended by the path, you think the two should 
coincide. But how should progress coincide with a thing, a movement with an 
immobility?’ (1991, pages 189-90) 
In other words we lose precisely that sense of expectation and retention, or being towards the future 
and thrownness. Or to take the gloss on his ideas from Gilles Deleuze, time and space are 
qualitatively, ontologically different and thus using one to describe the other creates a compound 
concept that is inherently chaotic because:  
‘movement is distinct from the space covered. Space covered is past, movement is 
the present the act of covering. The space covered is divisible, indeed infinitely 
divisible, whilst movement is indivisible, or cannot be divided without changing 
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qualitatively each time it is divided. This already presupposes a more complex idea: 
the spaces covered all belong to a single, identical, homogeneous space while the 
movements are heterogeneous, irreducible among themselves.’ (1986, page 1) 
I think this analysis is correct as far as it goes. Time is not reducible to this sense of space. But these 
are moves that define time as vibrant difference and space as repetition – by opposing time as flow, 
or in Bergson’s terms ‘durée’, to space as coordinates. It is an important critique of a dominant form 
of a ‘universal time [that] appears to be no more than a hypothetical projection, a time of 
generalized equivalence, a ‘flattened’ capitalistic time’ (Guattari 1992, page 15). The critique’s 
fundamental point then is to see time as about phase shifts, shifts of kind rather than just a 
movement in temporal location. The sense of time as just a series of instants and points denies this 
sense of qualitative difference – producing what Castoriadis calls ‘identitiary time’ since all the 
instants are ontologically identical:  
‘In this identitiary time exists the identitiary present and, reciprocally, identitiary time is 
but the innumerable (and numbered) repetition of identitiary presents, always identical 
as such and different only by their place’. (1987, page 201) 
This is forms the basis of what he calls ‘public time’. The sense of time here then we might label as 
‘chrono-time’, to signify the procession of empty sequences. Far from being the ‘real time’, or 
objective time, if past and future are implicated in each other then moments are not discrete objects 
but have a temporal unfolding and this is a post hoc representation of duration (Lloyd 1993, page 
98). Instead of our stories being fictional spins over the unyielding sequence of time, it suggest that 
‘[t]he reality of our temporal experience is that it is organised and structured; it is the “mere 
sequence” that has turned out to be fictional’ (Carr 1986, page 25). If we follow the idea of a phase 
shift between the past, future, and present, as an intensive boundary not an extensive one we could 
interpret both past and future, though inaccessible, as real, but as a virtual order rather than an 
actual one. We have then a more complex patterns of oppositions – the virtual (that which might be) 
is the antonym of the actual (that which is), but both are ontologically real. This shift in 
understanding suggest that while space preserves elements time devours them: 
‘Duration or the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and 
swells  as it advances. And as the past grow without ceasing, so also there are no 
limits to its preservation. Memory... is not a faculty of putting away recollections 
in a drawer, or of inscribing them in a register... In its entirety, probably, it [the 
past] follows us at every instant... leaning over the present which is about to join 
it, pressing against the portal of consciousness that would fain leave it outside.’ 
(Bergson 1991, page 7) 
 12
Here he suggests that each instant of the present brings with it a vast virtual order (figure 2) of 
memories stretching out from around our present action and called forth by our orientation in the 
world. Depending upon the issue upon which we are focused a different range of these memories is 
brought to bear – more narrowly or widely focused. However, they all still suffuse each specific 
instant. He argues for the reality and persistence of the past without committing it to being the same 
kind of thing as space. The present and past coexist in a virtual order: 
“We have great difficulty in understanding a survival of the past in itself because we 
believe that the past is no longer, that it has ceased to be. We have thus confused 
Being with being-present. Nevertheless the present is not; rather it is pure becoming, 
always outside itself. It is not, but it acts. Its proper element is not being but the 
active or useful. The past, on the other hand, has ceased to act or be useful. But it has 
not ceased to be. Useless, inactive, impassive it IS, in the full sense of the word: It is 
identical with being in itself.” (Deleuze 1991, page 55 emphasis in original) 
In a reverse of how we often think of time, the past does not recede but “literally moves towards the 
present” and exerts a pressure to be admitted (1991:70). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 round here  
 
This seems an important step forwards yet Bergsonian durée while not being a linear sequence can 
give the impression of being a smoothly flowing time. We need to emphasise the notion of attention 
to the world, as in Heidegger that orchestrates the recall of memories and the production of possible 
futures. This sense of time is perhaps best summed up as opportunity, not just about action but 
acting at the right time. To give this sense of time a name we might use ‘the Greek kairos: what we 
might call the temporal opportunities of everyday life’ (Maffesoli 1998, pages 108, 110). This is the 
sense of uniqueness of each moment, of its specific and irreproducible nature. To use an analogy 
then ‘If chronological time is like worldwide suburbia, kairological time is the genius loci, the spirit 
of that particular moment’ (Griffiths 1999, page 22). We might thus consider whether for each place 
with its genius loci there is not also a genius tempori. We might then think about these two types of 
time – chronological and kairological and their interaction with space as chora and topos (Figure 3). 
The models of times-pace in time geography tend to be chrono-chora, what Deleuze terms 
‘anywhere-whenevers’ (1989), of abstractly identical time-space units, and we can see Bergsonian 
influences in formulating a kairo-chora relationship. What is less often discussed are chrono-topos 
models and kairo-topos sense of time-space (Rämö 1999). It is to these latter two that I wish to turn 
in the next sections.  
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INSERT FIG 3 ROUND HERE 
  
These different senses of time have a dialectical relationship in the arts. Just as 1913 saw the Eiffel 
tower broadcast the hour ‘pips’ abolishing local times in France, it also saw the publication of 
Proust’s ‘A la recherché du temps perdu’ and ‘time, which in one sense had never been so public, 
so monolithic, had in another sense, with Proust, never been so private, so unique, so local to the 
psyche’s own hour’ where it was ‘all madelaines and murmuring memories of the time of the 
mind’. Far from being linear, it reflects the concern and attention of the mind where one day gets 
287 pages, another year does not even merit a mention, so much that Proust concludes his 
mammoth account that it is through time that humans occupy ‘a place, a very considerable place 
compared with the restricted one which is allotted to them in space, a place on the contrary 
prolonged past measure – for simultaneously, like giants plunged into the years, they touch epochs 
that are immensely far apart, separated by the slow accretion of many, many days – in the 
dimension of Time’ (Griffiths 1999, page 19). This sense of distension and connection then meant 
Proust had to deny he had written the literary version of Bergson’s theory, a ‘romans bergsonien’ 
(Gross 1985, page 376). He gives a different inflection than flow and narrative extending and 
unifying a subject. ‘Proust’s whole concept of memory was founded on the notion that we are not 
continuous but altogether discontinuous selves’ (Gross 1985:378). Whereas the phenomenological 
accounts point to two equal streams of time and consciousness in a perfect parallelism, here we 
have time disrupting the subject where, after Rousseau ‘Things always happen too early, 
understanding always comes too late’ (Bielik-Robson 2000, page 72). Instead of a simply ever 
expanding virtual cone of memory, ‘The eternity which Proust opens to view is convoluted time, 
not boundless time. His true interest is in the passage of time in its most real - that is space-bound - 
form’ (Benjamin 1973, page 206). While ‘Bergson denounces and rejects the metamorphosis of 
time into space, Proust not only accommodates himself to it but installs himself in it, carries it to 
extremes and makes it finally one of the principles of his art’ (Poulet 1977, page 4). But in  Proust 
space is figured  in a rather different way, acting to bound and contain an archipelago of incidents, 
or as Poulet (1977:90) puts it forming a dispersed set of ‘closed vases’, that are left by the 
withdrawal of life. Space is far from homogeneous or inert.  
 
Time as Space (part 2) 
 
Let us then think about  time using some different conceptions of space. I want to start by thinking 
of space as ‘topos’ and using that as a model for time. This approach underlies the recent work of 
Barbara Adam and her concept of ‘Timescape’ (Adam 1990; Adam 1995). The term is a deliberate 
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utilisation of the notion of temporal landscape to talk about how events and actions are located in 
time. Using landscape allows her to evoke the multiple dimensions of time, and the way they 
interact to form particular constellations. She outlines five temporal dimensions (figure 4). First 
there is ‘temporality’ as duration or brevity, in other words how long a specific event or action lasts. 
Second is the ‘time frame’ of how actions relates to each other – whether they occur simultaneously 
or in a sequence. Third, is the ‘time point’ by which she points to the frequency and sequence of the 
action itself – is it intended to recur, to be cyclical, if so how frequently. Fourth is ‘tempo’ which is 
about effects and connections, with causality and consequences worked out over time. Fifth is the 
notion of ‘timing’, like kairological time, the ability of people to take opportunities or indeed to 
miss them, or to find them precluded.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ROUND HERE 
 
The multiple aspects of any given event thus expand beyond simply future-present-past. Adam 
highlights for instance the dimension of synchronising action – where things must occur int eh right 
sequence and alongside each other as another way of understanding the multiple linkages of events 
in time rather than just as sequence or linear flow. Adam notes that despite the hegemony of 
abstract clock time, these other senses of temporality continue so that for instance ‘embodied time is 
lived and experienced alongside, despite of, and in conflict with the culturally constituted social 
relations of time’ (Adam 2003, page 61). She suggests we can see historical patterns of the five C’s. 
The creation of time to human design (C1), through technologies like clocks and diaries, but also 
novels and narratives, then the commodification of time (C2) as it becomes the criteria of pay and 
the measure of productivity, the compression of time (C3), as we increasingly look at real-time 
networks where effects at a distance occur (nearly) simultaneously, and thence  the control of time 
(C4) and finally  the colonization of time (C5), both in the sense of the intensification of routines 
into a 24/7 society but also our ability to discount costs into the future.  Using timescape allows us 
to register that all of these elements are in changing patterns, with alignments and conflicts between 
different elements. It is just too glib to talk about the dominance of space over time, when instead 
there are much more complex patterns of different sorts of space and time interacting. 
‘Cause and effect, linearity, spatiality, invariability, stability, clarity and precision 
are not being replaced but have alongside and superimposed contrasting temporal 
principles such as instantaneity, simultaneity, networked connections, 
ephemerality, volatility, uncertainty as well as temporal multiplicity and 
complexity. Emerging alternative and contradictory temporal principles constitute 
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today a lived reality for a significant number of people across the world’ (Adam 
2003, page 74). 
Alternately we might think of the kairo-topos or what, slightly confusingly for the terms I am using, 
Mikhail Bakhtin called a chronotope (Holquist 1990; Kneale and Holloway 2000). That is the unity 
of a specific sense of time with a specific kind of space. So I want to pick up on a writer who played 
with the relationship of space and time and their representation and think of James Joyce’s Ulysses.  
 
This text remains one of the great works of modernism and stream of consciousness style. 
Ostensibly the story of the peregrinations of one salesman for one day, written as though recording 
each thought and action as they connect to another, it plays with the conventions of time space and 
language. It was a shocking new work, not just for scatological and sexual references, but its 
linguistic novelty - reputedly it contains the longest unpunctuated sentence in English literature - 
while it also plays with notions of unfolding plot and time. The structure of the work is the 
encounters of Leopold Bloom over one day – from waking to a late and rather drunken somnolence. 
These frankly banal wanderings are sectioned and chaptered by headings lifted from Homer’s 
Odyssey. Clearly a set of parallels are being drawn, and for our purposes here we can focus in on 
the particular aspects highlighted by Umberto Eco – where he suggests Joyce presents a 
‘chaosmography’ (Eco 1989). Eco highlights the paradox of order and chaos, suggesting that the 
orderly cosmology of the Odyssey is deliberately set against the chaotic flux of the modern city. 
Thus through a series of inversions and paradoxes the book highlights both continuities and rifts. 
Most obviously, the text appeals to a mythic time, but then sets heroic Odysseus, one of the first 
human narrative heroes who struggles to shape his own destiny, against the bathetic figure of 
Bloom striving to stay afloat in modern society. It is never entirely clear ‘whether this parallel 
[Homeric] plot is an ironic , mocking memory of a heroic past world that emphasizes the emptiness 
of modern life, or whether it provides a source of enrichment, a promise of wholeness and 
atonement to come’ and how we reconcile the tension ‘of an irretrievable past and a paralyzed 
present’ (Rickard 1999, pages 14, 82). 
 
So the first temporality is that of the unmoving and eternal that embraces and swallows 
contemporary narratives. However, the time of the original Odyssey is that of a life journey, 
departing home, prevailing through travails and travels in a spatial story over twenty years. Ulysses 
takes the departure from home, though in this case it echoes the three lost Trojan stories and far 
from the constant wife maintaining the masculine home, it depicts inconstancy and insecurity for 
the hero. It also compresses all the wanderings and magical far off places into a single day in the 
city – time-space compression indeed. It marks out this hyper-intense day through the flood of 
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intertextual referents that Bloom negotiates –with news bills and papers bringing the world to him. 
The effect is one of chaos, not just as spatially distant events crowd in to the city, but also where the 
notion of building a narrative life project, a coherent self through binding past and future dissolves. 
The book thus appears to collapse time into simultaneities rather than offer temporal development 
(Tschumi 1999, page 170) The single day could be any day in a cycle of repetition, it is unchanging 
and yet unique. There is no resolution and Joyce leaves us with an unfinished event not gathered 
into a narrative whole (Schleiffer 2000, page 78). So there is fragmentation and yet an overarching 
frame of reference. The intertextual effects go beyond the Homeric backcloth, since Joyce’s method  
of composing involved an endless burrowing through newspaper reports and snippets about the city 
and society, and the final text is almost a collage of unsigned quotes and sources. The effect is to 
decentre the subject and the present which is seen then not as a self-present moment but one that is 
endlessly responding to the baggage of history – as when Stephen Daedalus sums up the Anglo-
Irish conflict by saying ‘apparently history is to blame’. More exactly for the sense of the ‘big now’ 
it suggests this is not an interior story but a dialogue with the world which reflects ‘that each one 
who enters imagines himself to be the first to enter whereas he is always the last terms of a 
preceding series even if the first term of a succeeding one, each imaging himself to be the first, last, 
only and alone, whereas he is neither first nor last nor only nor alone in a series originating in and 
repeated to infinity.’ (Joyce Ulysses 1961, page 731 cited in Schleiffer 2000, page 149). 
 
The fragmented self is articulated through an urban space where Stephen Daedalus and Leopold 
Bloom ‘do not go, like Proust’s Marcel, in search of lost time: memory is coextensive with their 
perceptions, manifesting itself in a thousand elusive forms’(Rickard 1999, p129 ). The city carries 
the proleptic force of memory as much as any agent and it interjects involuntary memories. It is not 
then the individual suturing a trajectory over time, but also the city interjecting and disrupting that 
account. Here ‘space functions in fiction through and as temporality, as a narrative event or events’ 
where it  represents a network of relationships bet they unfolded or not, or in Raymond Williams 
words, the ‘forces of action have become internal, and in a way there is no longer a city, there is 
only a man walking through not the history of the city but the loss of city’ (Johnson 2000, page 
200). The past pushes its way in o the protagonists times not as in the sense of Bergson’s structures 
of attention or Heidegger’s care, but through the spaces and arrangement of the city. The minute 
reconstruction of the city in the text is not about totalising command of the urban scene. So though 
Joyce wrote to his literary agent Frank Budgen that ‘I want to give a picture of Dublin so complete 
that if the city one day suddenly disappeared from the earth it could be reconstructed out of my 
book’ (Johnson 2000, page 199), he presents a city rising up in fragments, not laid out in either 
historical or spatial order: ‘‘Other novelists are ... much more likely to present the city in 
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reconstructable form. Joyce offers no architectural information, only places to bump elbows, or to 
lean them, to see out the corner of an eye, to recognize by a familiar smell. The city rises in bits, not 
in masses.’ (Ellman cited in Rickard 1999, page 142). This urban scene then works by bringing 
multiples spaces and times together into a paradoxical relationship 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The relationship between time and space I have tried to suggest is complicated by a number of 
factors. First, the very commonsensical facticity of the two has often meant they are not examined. 
However, the second issue is that they have often fed from each other in binary oppositions. Third, I 
have tried to show that the binary pairs to be of one specific kind of time against one specific kind 
of space. The first move to disrupt the binary opposition is thus to recognise the plurality of forms 
of both space and time. I have in the last two examples tried to suggest how some less common 
combinations of notions of space and time can produce different understandings. Later in that 
celebrated and much quoted passage by Foucault on the epoch of space he too says ‘space itself has 
a history in Western experience, and it is not possible to disregard the fatal intersection of time with 
space’. 
 
These last two examples suggest certainly, as Heidegger put it, ‘Time is not a thing’ (Schleiffer 
2000). It is not simply the rate or duration of events occurring in time but the shaping of the 
temporal framework in which those events occur. Furthermore our understanding of that time 
cannot stand outside time or space. As Derrida suggests ‘In a sense, it is always too late to talk 
about time’ (in Jameson 2003, page 697) because we and our ideas are always in its flow. We might 
follow Jameson to suggest we are perhaps always in the wrong place to speak of space. What seems 
to happen in many theories is that one of space or time is held constant, and thus producing rather 
distorted visions of time-space. Thus when time is conceived as difference it tends to be through a 
foil of space conceived as repetition of the same. When space appears as the preserver of past 
action, time is the destroyer. My aim then in this chapter has been fourfold. At the most basic level 
to illustrate that the meaning, and possibly the substance, of both time and space are plural. Second, 
feeding from this, any binaries tend to be using the characteristics of one definition of space or time 
against which to define the other term, and any such definition is thus hopelessly over-determined. 
Third, the two terms cannot really be separated so all action occurs in time-spaces. And finally this 
inseparability is not just a matter of bolting two conceptually discrete elements together, but the 
rather that the two are not separable conceptually. Or perhaps, to say that separating them into just 
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two terms is obfuscatory. I have tried to illustrate how geography has related time and space 
through the heuristic grid of chronos/kairos and chora/topos, with chrono-chora dominant. It is clear 
that simple binaries of time and space do not hold, but rather unravel and spawn yet more divisions. 
In our rethinkings of space and place I suggest we cannot simply ignore temporality and add it later. 
Rather geographers need to think through time-spaces of various sorts and how they impact on their 
work. 
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Figure 4 
 
 
TIMESCAPE = TIME, SPACE & MATTER 
  Temporality   Past   Duration ⇔Instantaneity 
  Time frame   Present  Sequence ⇔Simultaneity 
  Time point   Future   Repetition ⇔Rhythm ⇔Beat 
  Tempo     Cause ⇔Effect ⇔Time lag 
  Timing     Reason ⇔Action ⇔Symptom 
(Adam 2002) 
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